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NATO 1957 CONSULTATIONS ON A EUROPEAN INSPECTION ZONE TO GUARD AGAINST SURPRISE ATTACK

NATO consultations on disarmament during the summer of 1957 centered primarily on the dimensions of an inspection zone in Europe and the type of system to be applied within it. On August 2, 1957, NAC gave "concurrence in principle" to a Western offer for a European zone, extending from the Atlantic to the Urals and involving aerial and static ground controls, provided the USSR agree also to an Arctic or larger US-USSR zone and additional partial disarmament measures. NAC concurrence deliberately postponed for future decision the question of reciprocal mobile ground inspection about which the majority of the members had, and still have, deep seated objections. This paper outlines briefly the limits of the allied agreement which was reached and the basic reservations which remain unresolved. Views expressed by SACEUR, the Standing Group, Germany, France, UK, Canada, Italy, the Netherlands and Belgium are summarized in the annexes.

Background

Proposals for aerial and ground inspection systems to guard against surprise attack had been discussed since mid-1955, but not until November 17, 1956 did specific zones enter the field of serious international negotiation. The USSR then for the first time accepted the US concept of aerial inspection, combined with ground controls, in a first stage to be applied only to Europe in a zone 800 kilometers "east and west of the line of demarkation."

Responding to this and as authorized in the US November policy decisions, the US during the next several months undertook exploratory discussions on a tentative concept for initial zones to launch a surprise

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attack agreement, first among the Western members of the UN Disarmament Subcommittee meeting in London, and then, with their endorsement, in informal bilaterals with the USSR. The US illustrative concept suggested an Arctic-Far Eastern zone of 140° W to 160° E longitude, by 45° N latitude to the North Pole; and a European zone of 5° to 30° E longitude, by 45° N latitude to the Pole.

The Soviet delegation took a deep interest in these discussions, returned to Moscow for consultations in mid-April, and tabled counter proposals, "for negotiation", in London on April 30, 1957. Agreeing to a US-USSR zone for the first time, the USSR proposed a larger Far East zone, encompassing US-USSR territory between 108° E and 90° W longitude; and a European zone, the median line of which was moved off the demarkation line, of 0° by 25° E longitude, 54° N to 30° 38' N latitude. Airports were omitted from the list of ground control posts.

This launched the new round of wider consultations among the NATO allies.

NATO had been informed of the informal consultations undertaken in London with the USSR, in a report dated April 24, 1957 circulated at the May 1-3 NAC ministerial meeting in Bonn. Following an oral briefing by Moch and Stassen at the May 29, 1957 meeting, NAC on June 7 requested the Four Western Subcommittee members to submit their views on the size of a zone and asked SACEUR and the Standing Group for technical advice.

At a second oral briefing on June 29, Moch outlined the West's preliminary views which were formally transmitted to NAC on July 16. Throughout June and July NAC engaged in intensive discussion and debate on the subject, resulting in the Western offer to the USSR to inaugurate a surprise attack inspection system which included a zone in Europe.

The Western Offer on August 2, 1957

On August 2, 1957 -- repeated August 29, 1957 -- the Governments of Canada, France, the United Kingdom and the United States invited the USSR to join in "the establishment and maintenance of systems of inspection to safeguard against the possibility of surprise attack." Among the alternate areas proposed "with the concurrence in principle of their European allies" was one which included "all of Europe, bounded on the south by latitude 40 degrees north and in the west by 10 degrees west longitude and in the east by 60 degrees east longitude." If this area were rejected "a more limited zone of inspection in Europe could be discussed." This offer was subject to the proviso that the USSR must simultaneously

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agree to an Arctic or larger US-USSR zone as well as other partial disarmament measures.

The system of inspection was to be developed by a working group of experts appointed by the five Subcommittee governments. Such a system, "subject to the indispensable consent of the countries concerned," was loosely outlined as including "in all cases aerial inspection, with ground observation posts at principal ports, railway junctions, main highways and important airfields, etc., as agreed. There would also, as agreed, be mobile ground teams with specifically defined authority.

"Ground posts may be established by agreement at points in the territories of the states concerned without being restricted to the limits of the zones described...but the areas open to ground inspection will not be less than the areas of aerial inspection. The mobility of ground inspection would be specifically defined in the agreement, with in all cases, the concurrence of the countries directly concerned. There would also be all necessary means of communications."

The Limits of NATO Concurrence

The record of the 1957 negotiations reveals that basic reservations and conflicts of interest remain unresolved beneath the phrase "concurrence in principle" and that these reservations are considered by the countries concerned to be more than usually protected by formal assurances that "all further steps are "subject to the indispensable consent of the countries concerned."

A fundamental opposition to mobile ground inspection was reflected in the agreement to postpone decisions on this issue and to adopt deliberately ambiguous language for the Four Power Proposals which could mention aerial inspection, ground observation posts and mobile ground inspection teams without actually committing any of the proposed signatories to do more than, at a later date, try to develop a system to which they could bring themselves to submit. NAC informed the Western Four on July 24, with confirmation on August 2, 1957,¹ that "The Council accepts the idea of reciprocal aerial inspection but...wishes to emphasize that the military authorities attach great importance to the procedures for this inspection. The Council also accepts reciprocal static ground inspection...The Council fears that mobile ground inspection organized on a fairly large scale might lead first to demilitarisation and later to neutralisation. It recalls that the present phase is only of a preliminary character. It thinks that the procedures for operating mobile ground inspection must be known before accepting the principle itself. This being so, the Council feels that

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the question of reciprocal mobile ground inspection should be considered later."

The well-publicized unanimity of view among NATO nations was in fact essentially limited to agreement that the Western Four could table a paper during the 1957 Subcommittee negotiation offering to discuss a European zone extending from the Atlantic to the Urals, without prior agreement on the kind of inspection system to be included and with the understanding that, in the event of a Soviet interest in the boundaries of a "more limited zone", the Western Four would again consult with NATO before responding to this interest.

Opposition to Mobile Ground Inspection

The Standing Group, whose advice NAC sought, as well as US military staff studies, conceived of much more extensive and much more mobile ground inspection teams than most of the European countries and Canada were prepared to accept. Admittedly, the prolonged NAC debates took place in the absence of any substantive Four Power outline of specifications for an inspection system, but the disagreement over the extent and location of mobile ground inspection cut far deeper than technical issues of numbers of inspectors and nationality of planes.¹

The major issue was the contention, upheld most vigorously by France and Germany, that a multiplication of types of control in a single, limited geographical area would lead inexorably to a special status of demilitarization or neutralization for the area, which, it was claimed, in Europe would mean the demilitarization of NATO itself. The UK and Canada argued that extensive mobility of ground inspection was not necessary for measures designed solely to safeguard against surprise attack and should be reserved for measures in which actual reductions in armaments and forces were to be verified. This view was to some extent supported by the position of SACEUR who laid less emphasis than did the Standing Group on mobile ground inspection and was willing to rely on a predominantly aerial inspection system, the ground component of which would be primarily to verify unusual shifts in deployment of forces and planes or other "means of delivery" which had been spotted by aerial survey.

Many members of the Council did not need to be faced with the details of a mobile ground inspection system to be aware of their profound dislike and distrust of the concept, regardless of how it was clothed. The US representative raised the question directly at the

1. See Annexes for detail; A. SACEUR; B. Standing Group; C. Germany; D. France; E. United Kingdom; F. Canada; G. Italy; H. Netherlands and Belgium.

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meeting July 24, asking whether NAC did not like mobile ground inspection on the basis of its present understanding of what was involved, but would not necessarily foreclose such inspection if it had a better idea of the mechanics of the system. In reply, the UK, Canada, Germany, France and Belgium stated that they were in any case against mobile ground control for a first stage surprise attack inspection system in Europe, and Italy and the Netherlands, while reluctant to override military judgement, voiced their concerns as to the impetus such a system would give to the demilitarization of Europe.¹

The divergencies among the NATO allies were resolved, not in agreement over action but in agreed concern as to the consequences of action. The Secretary General, Paul-Henri Spaak, summed up that concern clearly and frankly at the height of the debate. The real difficulty, he said, was with the question of mobile ground control. All would agree, he thought, on the need for fixed ground posts, but the NATO military had said in no uncertain terms that mobile ground inspection was absolutely essential. On the other hand, Germany and France had expressed most important political reservations regarding mobile ground inspection reservations which he, the Secretary General, himself felt were well founded. He believed that there was real risk that such inspection could lead to demilitarization of area and eventually to neutralization. Also he felt it was difficult to accept the idea of thousands of Soviet inspectors moving about in the NATO area. And, finally, he said, NAC could not allow itself to be the cause of a break-off of negotiations. Perhaps, said the Secretary General, the best answer would be for NAC to advise the Western Four that mobile ground inspection should not be advanced in a first phase disarmament agreement in view of the vast political implications.²

Size and Presentation of the "More Limited Zone"

While NAC agreed that a European zone of 5° to 35° E longitude by 42° N "represents an absolute minimum" in terms of dimensions for the "more limited zone" which could be discussed, NAC did not agree that this zone could be proposed to the USSR without further consultation and authorization by NAC. The authorizing telegram left the tactics of presentation of zones up to the Four Western Powers but stated that "The Council feels it should inform you that certain delegations consider it better to suggest, in the first place" the alternative Western Hemisphere-USSR zones and the 10-60-40 degree zone in Europe.³

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The German representative made the strongest argument for this course of action, which was the one followed by the Western Four, adding in his statement that "The Federal Government, however, feel that this minimum proposal (the 5°-35°-42° zone) should be made to the Soviets only upon careful reconsideration within the NATO Council.¹ At this meeting the US representative assured the Council that "there would be no change from the position set out in the paper until the Soviet representative had made some response. When the reaction of the Soviet Government to their proposals was known, the four Western members would consult and pass on their suggestions to the NATO Council before taking action".²

SACEUR, while confirming that a 5°-35° zone was a minimum, took the position that the method of operation of an inspection system must be known before he would take a firm position on a 5-35° zone. The Standing Group took a firm stand that it could not endorse a 5°-35° zone unless a system of aerial inspection were combined with extensive mobile ground inspection.

NAC Competence to Review All Inspection Proposals

The Council considers that "they will be fully consulted and that their views will be fully taken into account before any agreement is reached upon details of an aerial and ground inspection system,"³ and that this assurance covers consultation on any system for an Arctic or other non-European zone system as well.⁴ Germany and Italy consider that they

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have additional assurances that "the representatives of the Four Western Powers in the working group would not take any decision without prior agreement of the NATO countries concerned."¹ Italy insisted on assurances that "qualified representatives of the countries concerned" be included in the working group of technical experts.²

The Four Power Message to NAC of August 2, 1957, stated that "The Four Western Delegations wish to confirm that all questions regarding the degree of mobility of inspection, which the Council wishes to study further in collaboration with the Four Western Delegations will remain a matter for further detailed development. The Council will be fully consulted and their views fully taken into account before the specifications and nature of the mobility of the inspection system are agreed to."³

NATO Declarations on Joint Technical Studies

The basic cleavage among the countries over the issue of mobile ground inspection developed in the absence of any technical presentation of what mobile ground inspection might in practice involve. At the present time, a full year later, no joint Western technical study has yet been undertaken, although there have been repeated declarations of intent.

The Council had recommended, in the Ninth Telegram of July 24, 1957 that "...the question of reciprocal mobile ground inspection should be considered later. In the meantime a study of a mobile and reciprocal inspection system should be carried out by the Council in collaboration with the representatives of the Four Western members in the Sub-Committee." At the August 2, 1957 meeting, NAC had invited the Standing Group to "continue their studies with a view to formulating more detailed views on an aerial and ground inspection system as further information became available."

Following the NATO Heads of Government meeting, NATO announced, in the communique of December 19, 1957, that "we have decided to establish a technical group to advise on problems of arms control arising out of new technical developments." The Secretary General's efforts to give effect to this resolution were overtaken by the 1958 spring summit preparations, and the establishment of a Working Group on Disarmament composed of the US, UK, France and Canada was tacitly considered --

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despite the fact that its members were not "technicians" -- to have taken the place of a technical group. On May 7, 1958, in the wake of the Copenhagen NATO ministerial meeting, NATO was still considering "the possibility of carrying out studies and experiments on the technical problems of inspection and control."

Some unilateral efforts have been made by the Standing Group and SACEUR, and NAC and Working Group political discussions on the Rapacki Plan and on German Reunification have reviewed closely related issues of partial demilitarization and neutralization, but detailed joint technical studies have not been involved.

The forthcoming Western-USSR technical talks are, therefore, of more than usual significance, inaugurating at the same time as they will the first joint technical study of surprise attack inspection methods undertaken by the Western Powers.

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ANNEX A

SACEUR

The Council sought and received the advice of SACEUR, General Norstad, who stated his views in a memorandum dated June 24, 1957, and a supplementary letter dated July 10, 1957. SACEUR also met with the Council at an extended session July 4, 1957.

At the NAC meeting July 4, Norstad stated that he had prepared his memorandum in terms of the following assumptions: (a) That the objective was to reduce the danger of surprise attack and to provide greater security; (b) that proposals should be reasonable to NATO authorities and to peoples of NATO countries; and (c) that account should be taken of what was thought to be acceptable to Russians, though this was not the overriding consideration.

He had considered three methods of inspection: Aerial inspection, ground inspection and radar chains. These three could be combined. However, aerial inspection could make a contribution to security by itself if the area were of sufficient size and the method of inspection was adequate. He emphasized repeatedly that the question was not merely a matter of the area to be covered; the rules under which inspection was carried out might be at least as important. In response to a question (by Turkey) as to what Norstad would consider "adequate", he replied that this could only be answered after lengthy expert study. For example, if airplanes had complete freedom to fly through zones at any time, this would be satisfactory. If, on the other hand, flights were to be limited to certain periods, he would have to study carefully to determine how many flights, at what altitude, etc., would be necessary to obtain complete coverage.

So far as ground inspection was concerned, Norstad considered that, in combination with aerial inspection, it would provide "vastly increased security." He pointed out that ground and air inspection reinforce each other and that results in terms of security were far greater than simple addition of two systems would imply. Responding to French concerns that ground controls might tend to create a neutralization of NATO forward area, Norstad said that this could only be answered in terms of a specific proposal, and that he had not thought that this would occur. Supervised visits to airfields to verify presence of planes could certainly take place without "neutralizing" NATO. In answer to a Greek question as to whether ground inspection would not be better than air, if the West could not have both, Norstad said, on the contrary, air inspections were far better. Adequate ground inspection without air would require tens of thousands of men and fantastic communications system. Aerial inspection was improving constantly and can be carried out reasonably cheaply. However, some kind of ground inspection was necessary if the system was to be completely effective.

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Overlapping radar screens, if combined with other forms of inspection, would again contribute disproportionately to total security. However, the relationship between radar and other inspection methods was not as close as between air and ground. Re radar chain, SHAPE thinking was in terms of three stations to cover the central European area, with no more than 200 men per station, perhaps less. If the Soviets were to neutralize such stations before attacking, Norstad repeated this would itself constitute warning.

With reference to the feasibility of air inspection zone without a median line, it was possible but there were technical reasons why it could be extremely difficult. The most effective equipment for aerial inspection was highly classified, and there might therefore be some question whether West or Soviets would be prepared to put such equipment in planes under international control.

It would not be necessary to withdraw equipment and armaments from inspection zone, provided nuclear warheads were not subject to inspection and provided delivery weapons were not subject to detailed study and examination by inspectors. He felt that adequate control could be achieved by knowledge of the location and number of delivery weapons. Moreover, he thought that control of nuclear warheads was not enforceable and should be specifically excepted in a first stage agreement. In a more comprehensive over-all disarmament agreement, the situation might be different. He stressed that warheads would have to be moved out of a zone if subject to security inspection and their withdrawal could destroy NATO defenses. In general he felt that there would be advantage for West in any one of the three areas which have been considered by the West: Atlantic to Urals, 5°-35° and 5°-30°. However, he could not recommend that any of them should be supported by NATO countries until the method of inspection is known.

Subsequently, in his letter of July 10, he advised the Council that after examining the facilities with "particular military significance" which lie in the area between 30° E and 35° E longitude, he advised that "this zone should be included in any air inspection system considered for Europe". He continued to insist that the type of system of inspection and control must be known before a judgment could be made as to the "contribution to security and safety from surprise attack" of a given zone.

Re southern and northern boundaries of a zone, Norstad thought that if the Atlantic to Urals zone were chosen, Greece, Turkey and all of Norway could properly be included. The area would thus include all of SACEUR strength, but was not an unreasonable exchange for Russia to the Urals. On the other hand, he felt strongly that all of Turkey should not be included if a 5°-35° zone were envisaged. He noted the importance of Eastern Turkey and stated that nothing comparable would be included on the Soviet side. He believed the area should go as far north as the Murmansk area.

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STANDING GROUP

On July 8 and again on July 11, 1957, NAC met with representatives of the Standing Group to hear their views on a European inspection zone, elaborating on the position laid down in memoranda circulated on June 24, 1957 and again on July 10, 1957.

The Standing Group views were directed principally to the effect upon the over-all security of NATO, of the creation of a zone of inspection. From the point of view of the security of NATO the Standing Group considered that the European inspection zone should be as wide as possible and that air inspection should be accompanied by ground inspection carried out with static and mobile units. Mobile ground control was essential in the area to be covered by air inspection. Fixed ground control posts outside that area might also serve a useful purpose.

After discussing the more restricted assumption of advantages of an inspection zone to safeguard against surprise attack, the Standing Group reached the conclusion that air inspection alone would confer an advantage on the Soviets because of the opportunities afforded them by espionage to check, on the spot, evidence revealed by aerial photography. Air inspection alone can no doubt supply the NATO military authorities with additional information but does not necessarily increase security and, from this standpoint, poses a number of problems.

It would be dangerous at present to allow the control of nuclear components. The Group agreed with General Norstad that control of delivery means was acceptable.

If Turkish territory were included, the zone should extend sufficiently to the east to include the land mass situated between the Black Sea and the Caspian Sea; 35° E longitude represents the minimum which could be regarded as militarily acceptable. It would be preferable for the final delimitation of the zone to be expressed, not in meridians of longitude and parallels of latitude, but by well defined landmarks, rivers, mountain ranges.


An overlapping radar chain would have some value but was far from being infallible. It would give no indication of the intent of large aircraft movements and it would be technically possible to block it out on certain occasions. Consideration of this should be postponed.

If the best results are to be obtained from air inspection of Soviet territory, the system should be operated entirely by Western teams except for personnel who might be required to ensure compliance with agreements pertaining to such inspections. If air inspection

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were carried out by joint teams, under United Nations or other international auspices, it would be impossible, for security reasons, to employ our best photographic and electronic equipment which the Standing Group believes to be in advance of that available to the Soviets.



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The Standing Group believes that the Soviet Union has a significant advantage in the field of electronic equipment, particularly in the area of electronic warfare. This advantage is based on the fact that the Soviet Union has been able to develop and produce electronic equipment at a much faster rate than the United States. This has allowed the Soviet Union to maintain a significant lead in the field of electronic warfare, which is a critical component of modern warfare. The Standing Group believes that this advantage will continue to be a major factor in the Soviet Union's military capabilities for the foreseeable future.

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GERMANY

In addition to high level representations made in Washington, London and Bonn, from May through August, the German position on a European inspection zone to guard against surprise attack was restated in NAC meetings of June 6, June 21, July 11, July 16, July 17, July 20, July 23, August 2, 1957. The statements of July 16 and August 2 quoted below cover the essentials of this position, with the exception of German opposition to overlapping radar which was stated in the July 11 meeting.

On July 16, 1957, Blankenhorn tabled a formal statement before the Council:

".....We wonder whether it is advisable to give the Soviets right from the start the choice between the different possibilities of zones. Would it not be better to negotiate step by step and to present alternatives only after having exhausted all bargaining possibilities of the different steps.

"As you know, the Federal Government raise no objection against the principle of a European aerial inspection zone whose main purpose is to protect the West against surprise attacks of the Soviets. The attitude of the Federal Government is, however, primarily determined by the consideration that this zone should be extended as deeply as possible into the Soviet Union. They would therefore, if the Soviets desire such a European aerial inspection zone, consider the 35th degree of longitude East as the extreme concession to the Soviets if no larger zones can be agreed upon. It is our hope that the Four Western Powers in London insist on this line in the negotiations.

"Despite the explanations of our military advisers we are not yet completely clear on the significance of aerial inspection. General Norstad has told us that, personally speaking, he would already consider aerial inspection in itself as an advantage. The Standing Group has stated for good reasons that only a system combining aerial inspection and mobile ground control would offer the necessary safeguards against surprise. We are anxious to know what this mobile ground control is to look like. The answer to this question will essentially determine our attitude.

"The reluctance of my Government to agree to mobile ground control in the first phase is due to the following reasons:

"On the one hand we wonder whether such a mobile ground inspection system would not be so complicated that its practical implementation could only be expected very slowly and perhaps take several years.

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"Furthermore we are afraid that the Soviets would react to a Western proposal to subject the area up to the 35th degree of longitude East to a system of combined aerial and ground inspection by the counter-proposal to restrict for the time being a ground inspection zone to a smaller area such as the Federal Republic, the Soviet zone of Germany, Poland and Czechoslovakia. Such ideas have already been expressed in our midst. At the same time the sentence in the draft Four Power proposal on zones... 'These posts and teams will be established by agreement anywhere in the territories of the states concerned, and without regard to limits of the zones of aerial inspection' opens possibilities for such Soviet proposals. In this respect we feel that there might be the danger that our area would be subjected to a status which would come very close to demilitarisation. I have to put to the Western delegates to the United Nations Disarmament Sub-Committee the question: Will you be in a position to reject such a Soviet counter-proposal without exposing yourselves to severe criticism from the public opinion in our countries?

"From this you can see that we are mainly concerned about the possibility that the area of ground inspection becomes smaller than that of aerial inspection. If both areas would be sufficiently large and identical in size our concern would be less strong. In any case it seems essential to us that the security of the West is not impaired either directly or indirectly through both systems of inspection and that they do not involve recognition of the so-called GDR or a perpetuation of the present demarcation line. Before we can finally commit ourselves we would be grateful therefore to get more detailed information about both systems of inspection and their technical implementation.

.....

"We therefore feel that in a draft agreement on European aerial inspection a clause should be inserted linking the duration of the agreement with certain progress in the solution of the political problems that is to say also reunification."

On August 2, 1957, the German representative again tabled a formal statement before the Council:

"We were all agreed within the NATO council that a zone between 5 degrees east longitude and 35 degrees east longitude should be considered as a minimum proposal. The Federal Government, however, feel that this minimum proposal should be made to the Soviets only upon careful reconsideration within the NATO council.

"Although that part of the working paper dealing with mobile ground inspection does not take fully into account the decision of the NATO Council of 24th July, the Federal Government, all other


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countries agreeing, would be prepared no longer to insist on their objections. The misgivings which the Federal Government still maintain concern, above all the possibility that such a system of intense inspection in a limited part of Europe might to a dangerous degree come near to demilitarization or neutralisation.

"The Federal Government note with satisfaction that under the amended proposal, the mobile ground inspection zone will under no circumstances be smaller than the air inspection zone.

"The Federal Government regard it as essential that the Council be consulted in time on any Western proposals regarding the details of the inspection system before they are submitted to the Soviets. The same applies to the Western proposals made within the Working Group of Experts to be established according to item 5 of the working paper."



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ANNEX D

FRANCE

The French position on the political undesirability of mobile ground inspection coincided with the German position, although, in contrast to the German stand, the French representative in the Subcommittee, Moch, initially believed that it was important at least to present the dimensions of a more limited European zone to the USSR from the outset.

In a memorandum, "Resume of Personal Ideas", dated June 12, 1957 and circulated in London among the Subcommittee members, Moch said:

"We must avoid at the outset that the various methods of control pile up in Europe and constitute the priming for a limitation of armament by sector and of 'pre-neutralization.' We must then extend the air sector strongly towards the east in such a way as to render it acceptable to the various NATO states."

Moch then went on to argue that mobile ground inspection should be instituted to verify reductions in manpower and armaments taking place in the second stage and should then be applicable to the whole of the territory of all the countries subject to agreement on reduction of manpower and armaments, not merely to countries included in initial surprise attack inspection zones.

During the NAC discussion on June 29, Moch, who gave a preliminary presentation of Western Four views, stated that the Western Four 50-35° zone was primarily an aerial inspection zone. There might be some fixed ground control posts in zone as well as elsewhere, but Moch thought mobile ground inspection as envisaged in the SACEUR paper probably would have to wait for second stage in view of likely Soviet objections.

On July 23, the French Representative told the Council that, after due reflection, France had concluded that mobile ground inspection should not figure in first stage. The disadvantages of this type of control would outweigh advantages. However, fixed ground posts would have to have a certain degree of mobility, e.g., inspectors in a port would have to be able to move about within the port area. This however, was quite different from the concept of "unlimited mobility" generally associated with the phrase "mobile ground inspection."

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ANNEX E

UNITED KINGDOM

The UK stated its views on zones of inspection and control in an informal paper circulated among the Western Four in London, July 5, 1957:

"The United Kingdom Delegation believes that in any disarmament agreement it is important to distinguish between measures designed to give protection against surprise attack on the one hand and measures for verifying disarmament reductions on the other.

"In the first stage of a disarmament plan, the United Kingdom Delegation can agree to the following provisions:

"(1) Measures to give protection against surprise attack:
(a) aerial inspection in an area extending from the Urals to the Atlantic Ocean or, as a minimum, an area from 5° to 35° East. (b) ground control posts at airfields, ports, railway stations and main highways within the same area (or possibly a somewhat smaller area).

"(2) Measures for verifying disarmament: (a) Examination of documents relevant to military establishments, manpower, equipment and military expenditures. (b) International supervision of all depots in which arms are to be sequestered. (c) Right of accredited representatives of the international control organization to free movement within the territories of signatory states and across national frontiers, it being understood that access to objects of control other than the designated control points referred to above will be reserved until the second stage of disarmament."

At the NAC meeting of June 26, 1957, the UK representative gave the following preliminary comments of his government on SACEUR's views, as stated in his memorandum of June 24, 1957:

(1) The UK government believes that it is important to distinguish between guarding against surprise attack and controlling the implementation of disarmament proposals. From the point of view of guarding against surprise attack, the UK believed that General Norstad's views that an inspection zone in Europe would be advantageous to the West were sound.

(2) The UK agreed with Norstad that inspection of nuclear components was not practical and that the West should concentrate on control of delivery means and vehicles.

(3) The UK believed considerable care was necessary before proceeding further in the field of ground inspection, and preferred a wider area for ground inspection to bring it more or less into line with the area to be covered by air inspection.

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(4) The UK believes that Norstad's proposal for air control seemed to be acceptable.

(5) The question of radar chains should be considered further. The radar chain proposal was one feature of the proposed Treaty of Assurance to be offered to the Russians. The UK doubted whether it would be wise to make so important a concession early in the proceedings, and thought it might be better to hold it in reserve until negotiations on German reunification had started.

(6) The UK suggested that perhaps it would be possible to have ground inspection without any line of Division.

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ANNEX F

CANADA

The Canadian reservations on the issue of mobile ground control were elaborated for the most part outside the NAC forum, in the course of bilateral negotiations on the Arctic zone proposals.

Canada's concern over the elements of ground inspection was expressed in a Memorandum dated June 21, 1957, presented by Ambassador Johnson to Governor Stassen at a bilateral held in London the same day:

"We are concerned at the implication...that there might be a special regime on the ground within the proposed zones. It does not appear to us to be necessary to make a special reference to ground inspection in this passage, if the USA contemplates no more than radar posts."

At the time of the initial Canadian agreement jointly to sponsor a Western Hemisphere-USSR inspection zone, on July 13, 1957, the Canadian representative formally informed Mr. Stassen that:

"My authority to proceed in this way is given on the understanding that the aerial inspection zones outlined above would involve only such ground establishments as would be necessary to provide logistic support for the aerial inspection zone. Proposals for ground control posts or radar posts would be separate matters, requiring separate decisions."

Canada was assured, in a note handed to Prime Minister Diefenbaker by Secretary Dulles in Ottawa July 28, 1957, that:

"The precise character of the inspection would have to be worked out subsequently by mutual agreement. As we now see it, such inspection should, in principle, involve (a) air inspection, (b) fixed ground posts and (c) ground teams sufficiently mobile to verify the originally announced "blueprints" of military installations and subsequently announced changes and apparent discrepancies revealed by aerial inspection."

Subsequently, on August 12, 1957, the Canadian head of the delegation, Ambassador Johnson formally confirmed his understanding of this assurance and restated the Canadian position in a memorandum handed to the head of the US delegation, in London:

"As regards aerial and ground inspection against surprise attack the instructions of the Canadian Representative on the Disarmament Sub-Committee are to take the stand that the Canadian Government accepted both aerial and ground inspection in specified areas, but that they were considered not dependent on each other and therefore could see no reason why the one should be made conditional upon the other."

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ANNEX G

ITALY

At the NAC meeting on July 11, 1957, Italy stated that the Italian Government was prepared to accept air inspection of the Italian Peninsula provided that the inspection zone also included the territory of Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria, Yugoslavia and the northern part of Albania.

At the meeting on July 23, Italy stated that it could accept ground control, including mobile ground, on the following conditions: (a) That ground controls be applicable to all parts of territory of all countries participating in an agreement; that they comprise from the first phase not only ports, major highways and railways but also airports; (b) that Yugoslavia be included; (c) that all interested countries participate "on a basis of absolute parity" in the organization and implementation of the controls; (d) that ground control posts, fixed or mobile, be limited to the most sensitive points and be set up in such way as to bring about effective control without at same time giving to the one in question a demilitarization character; (e) that ground control outside the zone of aerial control be established on a basis of reciprocity, taking account of "operational, production and organizational factors" in such a way as to establish an equilibrium between the different zones. Italy believed it necessary to avoid concentration of multiple controls in certain zones, notably in Europe, which would tend to create demilitarized area. However, Italy was reluctant to override the views of military on need for mobile ground inspection.

The Italian representative insisted at the NAC meeting held August 26, that Italy was ready to submit to inspection and limitation of armed forces and armaments only if Yugoslavia were included in the inspection zone. He also asked for assurances that "qualified representatives of the countries subject to control" be included in the proposed expert working group, and in any event that the representatives of the four western powers in the working group would not take any decision without the prior agreement of the NATO countries concerned. Mr. Pink (United Kingdom) thought that this assurance could be given.

Italy made representations again on August 28, and these were formally transmitted to the Western Four in the Twelfth Telegram from the Secretary-General:


"The Italian Delegation, while noting the assurances given, do not consider the last telegram from the Four to be an explicit reply to the fifth paragraph of the Eleventh telegram from the Secretary General and reaffirm their express wish that the Italian Government be invited to become a member of the Sub-Committee referred to in paragraph VIIB [of the Four Power Paper] and of the Control Office referred to in paragraph VIIIIB."

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ANNEX H

NETHERLANDS

At the NAC meeting of July 23, 1957, the Netherlands representative stated he thought that there should be some combination of ground and air inspection but not necessarily mobile ground. In any case, ground and air inspection should be linked and nuclear warheads should not be subject to inspection.

BELGIUM

At the same meeting, July 23, 1957, the Belgian representative stated that: What was involved was choice between evils: (a) the military evil of inadequate inspection without mobile ground controls; and (b) the political evil of demilitarization resulting from mobile ground controls. If forced to choose, the Belgian representative would accept the military evil.



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